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THE RECENT PSEUDO-MONROEISM.

THE first of the preceding articles has clearly demonstrated what the Monroe Doctrine was, as understood by those who originated it. It was a protest against intervention, by a league of *jure divino* European monarchies, in the internal affairs of the Spanish-American states, for the purpose of reimposing upon those states the restored *jure divino* monarchy of Spain ; and the menace to the peace and safety of the United States involved in such an intervention arose out of the three facts : that one of the Spanish-American states, Mexico, was our immediate neighbor ; that the system of the *jure divino* monarchy was inimical to the republican constitutional system of the United States ; and that the principle of this intervention would justify the reimposition of the sovereignty of Great Britain upon the United States themselves by the power of a European alliance.

The second of these articles has as clearly shown that, in the only instance in our history in which the United States were actually called upon to deal with something like the intervention against which President Monroe protested, those who then conducted our diplomacy made no mention of the Monroe Doctrine, as the ground upon which the United States stood in the position which their government assumed. There were reasons for this. The chief reason has been stated in the previous paper, and I will not repeat it. But there was another reason, one well understood by those of us who lived during the fifties and sixties and had any consciousness of the feelings of the party and the administration which put an end to the slave power. It was, that the Monroe Doctrine was in deep disrepute on account of the interpretation put upon it by the slaveholders ; or more correctly, on account of the fact that another doctrine had been substituted by them for the original, with the purpose of arousing a jingoism throughout the country,

that should effect the extension of slave territory toward the southwest. They had taken out of Mr. Monroe's famous message the paragraph which declares that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers," and had made a new Monroe Doctrine out of it. This later doctrine taught that the United States should seize parts of Mexico and Central America and even Cuba, in anticipation of their seizure by European powers, and encouraged the plan for making the Gulf the Mediterranean of a slave empire; and, strange as it may now appear, the ground for this policy was that the "free republic" could not permit the despotisms of Europe to have foothold on American soil.

This was the slaveholders' Monroe Doctrine. It was what was called the Monroe Doctrine in the fifties. It was a stench in the nostrils of the opponents of slavery extension; and when they came into possession of the government, they naturally made no use of it in their diplomacy. Mr. Seward founded his case against France, as the foregoing article demonstrates, entirely upon the old, sound, universally recognized principle, that every state has the right to resist acts of another state toward a third party, which are a serious menace to its own safety, peace and welfare.

It now remains for me, in the third number of this series, to examine the new doctrine put forward by Mr. Olney and President Cleveland, and called the Monroe Doctrine. Prefatory to its analysis, I feel myself fully warranted in affirming that it is not the real Monroe Doctrine, as advanced and understood by Mr. Monroe himself, — simply because it cannot be. The Holy Alliance has been dead for fifty years, and there is nothing in European politics which bears the faintest resemblance to it. There is not a *jure divino* monarchy in Europe this side of Russia, and there is more liberty, better government and a more perfect reign of peace in any European state this side of Russia than in the best-ordered state in South America. Finally, the principle of non-intervention by one

state in the internal affairs of another is now, and has been for nearly fifty years, a universally recognized rule in the diplomacy of Christian governments, and there is not a state in Europe which manifests the slightest intention of imposing a *jure divino* monarchy, or any other system of government, upon any South American state.

With the political and governmental conditions of Europe so radically different from those that prevailed in the third decade of this century, there can be no such thing as the original Monroe Doctrine in the practical politics of America to-day. There can only be some other doctrine, bearing perhaps some resemblance to the slaveholders' Monroe Doctrine, to which shrewd politicians have given the time-hallowed name.

If there is anything which distinguishes a people ripe for self-government and republican institutions from those peoples who are not, it is the ability and the determination to look into the substance of things and to remain unimpressed by names, catchwords and phrases. The elevation of any political idea or doctrine to the position of a fetich, at the mention of whose name eyes are closed, ears are stopped and tongues rattle with excited gibberish, is the surest evidence of unfitness for such government and for such institutions. The existence of any such doctrines in the political science of a people is a great source of danger. They should always be scrutinized with suspicion and skepticism, and the psychological tendency to create them should be detected and eradicated. Above all, a republican people should consign to the realm of silence, if not of infamy, political leaders who, by a clever jugglery with words and phrases, undertake to excite sentiment instead of reflection, and to enthrone passion where reason and conscience should sit in the serenity of insight and the calm courage of righteousness.

But let us see if we may, perchance, find out what this doctrine is which Mr. Olney and Mr. Cleveland call the "Monroe Doctrine," and at the enunciation of which the clear sky of American politics suddenly became electric with storm and covered with darkness, producing loss and confusion in busi-

ness, decline of confidence in the public finances, action without discussion on the part of Congress, and a general outburst of violent anger against a friendly power.

Mr. Tilden once said, I believe, that he thought the Monroe Doctrine might be a good thing if one could only find out what it was. Were he alive to-day, he would be more likely to think it a bad thing if one could only find out what it is. I doubt very much, however, if he could find out what it is from the recent pronunciamentos of Mr. Olney and Mr. Cleveland. I have studied these documents now for a month, and I am not at all sure that I have found out what their authors conceive it to be. More correctly, I feel forced to say that I have found several Monroe Doctrines in them, neither of which is Mr. Monroe's Monroe Doctrine.

In the first place, Mr. Olney in his note represents Mr. Monroe's Monroe Doctrine as consisting of two parts, *viz.*, the declaration that the United States will resist the extension of the system of the allied powers to any portion of either (American) continent, and the assertion that the Americas are no longer subject to future colonization. Now it has been shown in the first number of this series that this latter part was not originally regarded as included in the Monroe Doctrine, but that after twenty years had elapsed it was, by means of sophistical interpretation, fashioned into the slaveholders' Monroe Doctrine.

Mr. Olney says of this part :

That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. *We are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical application of the Monroe Doctrine,* the disregard of which by a European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness toward the United States. The precise scope and limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations, or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It

does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American state or in the relations between it and other American states. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American state or to prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure. *The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies.*¹

It will be observed that in this statement of the doctrine Mr. Olney has taken some liberties with Mr. Monroe's language. While Mr. Monroe's declaration was against the then allied powers, and against the extension of their then existing system to any portion of either American continent, Mr. Olney turns it against any European power and any European political system, and, in the case in hand, against the very European power which never belonged to the Holy Alliance, which denounced and repudiated its principles, both in internal government and international relations, and which joined hands with the United States in resisting the extension of these principles to the Americas. But I do not wish to make any point of this.

When, now, Mr. Olney comes to apply the doctrine as thus stated by himself to the case of the Venezuelan boundary, he evidently finds himself in the face of some difficulties. He finds an old European colony situated on both banks of the Essequibo, having therefore good claim in international law to the watershed at least of this river, enjoying prosperity in peace and liberty under stable liberal government. He finds a comparatively new Spanish-American state, born in rebellion, baptized in secession, and consecrated in revolutions too numerous to mention. He finds this new-born state, in all the vigor of youthful self-assertion, laying claim to the territory south-eastward from its quaky capital, across the mountain range just behind it, down into the valley of the Orinoco, over the big river, across its unsettled eastern valley, up to the

¹ These lines are italicized by the author of this article.

watershed, then over that and down into the valley of the Essequibo to the west bank of this stream, and exhibiting in support of this claim a list of documents as long as the name of a Spanish grandee, beginning with Pope Alexander's famous bull and ending with the last Venezuelan constitution. And he finds "merry Old England" smiling serenely at the plucky impudence of the upstart,—for she rather likes pluck even though spiced with impudence,—advising, however, moderation, and offering this line and then that, all within the natural physical boundary of her colony, but when each of these is indignantly refused, at last, with patience a little worn, declaring that she will hear no more of Venezuelan lines which include her actual settlements, but will arbitrate what lies between them and the watershed line, which international law would give her in the absence of positive agreements or permanent occupation to the contrary.

It was rather difficult for Mr. Olney to find in any or all of these facts any attempt on the part of "a European power or combination of European powers" forcibly to "deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government," or "of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies." In fact, he does not undertake so hopeless a task. But, in order to bring this boundary dispute within the rule of the "doctrine," he first presumes that there *is* a legal boundary somewhere to the east of Great Britain's irreducible line, although he says he does not, and then he declares that, if Great Britain "*is appropriating Venezuelan territory, it is not material that she does so by advancing the frontier of an old colony instead of by planting a new colony.*"¹

Mr. Olney thus, in order to bring the case in hand within the rule, slides back to the slaveholders' Monroe Doctrine, a doctrine with which he himself declares a few paragraphs back we have no further concern, and which he there discards from the question as having no further import in the Monroe Doctrine of to-day.

Here then we have one Monroe Doctrine in the rule and

¹ Italicized by the author of this article.

another one in the application of the rule to the case. Before proceeding in our search for other Monroe Doctrines in this remarkable note of the Honorable Secretary of State, let us analyze a little more closely this one, which he at first discards and then applies to the case in hand.

He says that if "Great Britain is appropriating Venezuelan territory, it is not material that she does so by advancing the frontier of an old colony instead of by planting a new colony." That is, the right of the United States to object to Great Britain's appropriating Venezuelan territory by advancing the frontier of Guiana, is derived from the doctrine that no *new* colony may be planted by a European power in the Americas ; and the logical connection between the two propositions is the declaration that there is no material difference in the two procedures from the point of view of the result attained.

Now it seems to me that this declaration is a pure assumption and is clearly erroneous. It must be remembered that we are considering these two methods of acquisition from the point of view of a right of the United States to intervene, and not from that of Venezuela's territorial area. From the only point of view which we are authorized to take, the two methods differ most widely in every respect.

In the first place, even if, in the settlement of the boundary between this old British colony and Venezuela, Great Britain should get a few thousand square miles more of the wild region in dispute than Venezuela thinks or the United States think she ought to have, the result would be altogether trifling in comparison with the establishment of a new colonial center in or near disputed territory, with new lines of indefinite radiation. Mr. Olney is a good lawyer. He had the reputation once of being a good publicist. He is undoubtedly acquainted with the maxim "*de minimis non curat lex*," a principle contained in every system of enlightened jurisprudence in the world. If the law which regulates the relation between individuals cannot concern itself with petty things, surely diplomacy, which must always deal far more with the large and the indefinite, cannot.

In the second place, the planting of a new colonial center by any European power in or near disputed territory would be *prima facie* evidence of an intention on the part of that power to increase its colonial possessions, while no such intention can be presumed from boundary claims and disputes between an old colony and its neighbors. The argument of Mr. Olney on this point, if accepted as the rule of conduct in the diplomacy of the United States, would introduce into that diplomacy a spirit of indiscriminate suspicion and a practice of trifling pettifoggery, which would destroy its efficiency and keep the country in constant turmoil. No surer way could be devised to bring wars upon ourselves, and all the ills of military government.

The right of the United States to interfere in boundary disputes between an American state and an American colony of a European power cannot be derived from a right to object to the establishment of new colonial centers in the Americas by European powers. Interference must be based on a much wider principle. It must be based either on the principle of a general protectorate of the United States over the boundaries of the American states as against the American colonies of European powers ; or on the sovereignty of the United States over the Americas ; or on the fact that the peace, safety or cardinal interests of the United States are directly and seriously menaced.

Have the United States, then, a general protectorate over American states ? If they have, the fact certainly finds no expression in Mr. Monroe's Monroe Doctrine. It must rest upon a brand new doctrine, which should be compelled to justify itself under the burden of a new name, as an innovation, and should not be allowed to steal the prestige of an old and revered title. As a matter of fact, we know of course that no such protectorate does exist. The question before us is : Shall we assume it ? I do not propose to argue this question in this paper. But I may mention some things which are certainly incumbent upon the United States should they determine to play this rôle, and some other things which ordinary prudence would dictate to be necessary preliminaries to entering upon it.

In the first place the United States should give fair notice to the world of such an intention. It would be an act very seriously affecting international relations, and all the members of the international sisterhood are entitled to be fully apprised of any such innovation. In the second place, all pending issues should be excepted from the operation of the new principle, on the well known and universally accepted maxim of both public and private jurisprudence, that retroactive measures are generally unjust and not permissible. In the third place, the United States should be prepared to accept the responsibilities as well as the rights of such a protectorate,—that is, the United States must be prepared to enter upon a course of political entanglements with European powers in regard to their colonial possessions in America, and to answer to those powers for the unlawful acts of the American states in the intercourse of nations.

In order now to enjoy these rights and discharge these responsibilities, prudence would certainly dictate preparations which should bear some reasonable relation to the work to be accomplished. In the first place, the United States should put their five thousand miles of seacoast in a state of proper defense. Ten years of labor and the expenditure of a few thousand millions would do that. In the second place, a navy of at least five hundred war vessels must be created. It could be done at the same time that the work on the defenses would be in progress, and at a cost of about a thousand millions. In the third place, a standing army of at least five hundred thousand men must be raised, organized, equipped and supported. This could be done in less time than that required to complete the coast defenses and build the navy, and at the cost of about a thousand millions per annum. Grand prospect ! Plenty of offices, plenty of government contracts, large profits, abundance of work, high prices, and endless sensations ! But it must all be paid for in the end in mountains of treasure certainly, and in rivers of blood and centuries of misery probably. The military system, which we have been taught to believe is the sum of villainies and misfortunes, would be our perma-

nent form. We may well stop and consider long and earnestly whether the game is worth the candle.

Mr. Olney, however, as we have seen, in one paragraph renounces the protectorate as his "Monroe Doctrine," or rather as one of his "Monroe Doctrines," though his propositions involve it as their supporting principle. But in a subsequent paragraph he expressly advances a doctrine which goes far beyond the protectorate—a doctrine upon which the United States may base the exercise of any power whatsoever over the rest of the American states, and, so far as I can see, over the American colonies of European powers. His words are: "To-day the United States is practically *sovereign* on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Leading up to this imperial utterance, he had said a few sentences back: "That distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient, will hardly be denied."

Now here is a doctrine far in advance of anything ever before proposed. It certainly is not Mr. Monroe's "Monroe Doctrine." Mr. Monroe expressly disclaims it in his noted message. I hardly know if Mr. Olney himself calls it *the* "Monroe Doctrine," or a "Monroe Doctrine," or even one of his "Monroe Doctrines." It is surely Mr. Olney's own child, and I think it will have to bear his own name. It would be an unendurable libel to charge its paternity to Monroe.

But let us examine this new doctrine in both its parts.

Is it, in the first place, a notice to the European powers which have American colonies to prepare to get out, to make way for the complete realization of that sovereignty of the United States over the Americas which is already, according to Mr. Olney, practically established? Or is it only the expression of Mr. Olney's idea of the part which physical geography plays in the permanent political organization of states? If it is only the latter, we shall be rather inclined to agree with him, but at the same time we are bound to criticise Mr. Olney's judgment in inserting it in a diplomatic note to be transmitted

to the government of a European power having American colonies. Any tyro in diplomacy might anticipate that such a power would be very likely to take the expression in the former sense, and would consider it an interference with its relations to its own colonies. It is quite evident from the tone of Lord Salisbury's reply that he felt this proposition in Mr. Olney's communication to be highly impertinent. The country cannot be called upon to follow a diplomatist who manifests so little ability to measure the probable effect of the language he employs.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Olney really intended his words in this connection as a notice to Great Britain that the government of the United States is contemplating and expecting her withdrawal from the Americas, in order to make way for the assumption of the sovereignty of the United States over them, then it cannot be claimed that Mr. Olney has made a *faux pas* in his language, but he has certainly proposed for his country a gigantic enterprise. As I have said, it is certainly no part of Mr. Monroe's Monroe Doctrine, and we must insist that it shall not cloak its real aspects under that name. We must insist that it shall accept the disadvantages of being a new doctrine, an innovation, and carry the burden of proof for its justification.

I do not propose in this paper to argue the question as to whether we should undertake this vast enterprise or not, at any more length than I did the question as to whether we should assume the protectorate over the American States not colonies of European powers. All that was said on the latter subject as to giving the world a proper notice of our intentions, and placing ourselves in a proper condition of offensive and defensive strength to execute those intentions, applies with equal if not greater force to this more radical program. But there is one thing more which we certainly ought to do as preliminary to entering upon this course of conquest, and that is, *find the principle of ethics for its justification*; for we could no longer rest upon the right of self-defense, or plead the spirit of chivalry, as our moral warrant for such a policy.

There is undoubtedly a duty resting upon civilized states to carry civilization into the abodes of barbarism, and this duty gives a right. The right, however, must be limited by the purpose; and must not be made a means for any other end than the spread of civilization. It cannot justify the imposition of the foreign power upon a population which, though far behind and making slow progress, shows a fair capacity to work out its own civilization. It cannot justify the expulsion of one civilized power by another from a field properly occupied and fairly well worked. And it cannot justify a civilized power, which itself does nothing for the civilization of a barbaric region, in attempting to hold that region indefinitely against the entrance of other civilized powers. These are the ethical lines within which the United States must move in entering upon the policy of extending their sovereignty over the Americas. In the present condition of civilization upon these continents, it would seem that these moral defenses would prohibit the United States as well as the European states from making any part of the Americas objects for colonization. Lord Salisbury himself recognizes this fact so far as Europe is concerned. He says, in his answer to Mr. Olney's note, that the British government accepts the view or doctrine that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in the Americas by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any European state would be a highly inexpedient change. I do not understand why this sentence in Lord Salisbury's communication has not received more attention in the discussion of this correspondence. It is certainly a most sincere assurance of his good faith in dealing with the question of the boundary between Guiana and Venezuela. I do understand, on the contrary, how a European motherland would be of vast advantage to an American colony in case the United States should determine to enter upon a course of colonization in the Americas. It would protect the colony against a power whose sovereignty over it, once established, would be, according to Mr. Olney's idea, a far more natural, and therefore a far more permanent, condition than the sovereignty of a European motherland. The permanent

future independence of the American states and colonies is probably in greater danger from the United States than from any European power or any combination of European powers. This is most certainly true, if the United States are already entertaining any plans for the realization of a practical sovereignty, as Mr. Olney names it, over the American continents.

Now I do not think that Mr. Olney meant just this by his clumsy phrases. His offense is rather the loose use of misleading language in the official discussion of a delicate phase of a serious question. But I do know that there are men in these United States who are contemplating this gigantic enterprise, who are anxious to hasten the course of what they consider the manifest destiny of the United States in this respect, and who have been greatly encouraged by Mr. Olney's utterances. In view of the existence of such a spirit it may be prudent for the Central and South American states not to throw themselves too unreservedly into the arms of the United States.

Unless there should be a distinct decline in the civilization of the Latin-American states, I myself should be at a loss to find the ethical ground for the forcible extension of the sovereignty of the United States over them, or any part of them. I must leave that task to those who approve such an enterprise. All I mean to say is, that an ethical ground must be found and must be demonstrated to the reason of the people of the United States, but must not be assumed, even though the dictum of Mr. Olney may be so tortured as to warrant that assumption.

If we go back with Mr. Olney to the parent principle from which he professes to derive these different Monroe Doctrines, we shall certainly find something upon which we can all stand. It reads as follows in his own language :

That there are circumstances under which a nation may justly interpose in a controversy to which two or more other nations are the direct and immediate parties, is an admitted canon of international law. The doctrine is ordinarily expressed in terms of the

most general character, and is perhaps incapable of more specific statement. It is declared in substance that a nation may avail itself of this right whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious and direct menace to its own integrity, tranquillity or welfare.

We all agree with Mr. Olney in this enunciation of the principle. He says, "*perhaps* it is incapable of more specific statement." We go further, and say that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to give it a more specific statement, without robbing it of its character as a recognized principle of international law, and changing it into a mere *ex parte* dictum. Certainly there is nothing in the mere name of a continent, or in the distinctions between longitude and latitude, to render practicable a more specific statement of the principle. Upon this principle, the United States have the right to interfere in the political controversies of Europe, of Asia and of Africa when the integrity, tranquillity or welfare of this nation is directly menaced ; and they have no better right nor greater right to interfere in the controversies of American states to which they are not an immediate party, except upon the ground that their integrity, tranquillity or welfare is more seriously menaced in the latter case than in the former. In both cases, and in all cases, that menace must be clearly and distinctly proven to the reason and the judgment of the people, and not hastily formulated out of some loose and hazy sentiment drawn from the stock-in-trade of practical politics, or even from the inflated articles of a popular creed.

My chief criticism of Mr. Olney is, that he did not stick to his own statement and make out his case of a direct and serious menace to the integrity, tranquillity or welfare of this country involved in the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, but, on the contrary, attempted to do what he himself concedes to be perhaps impossible, *viz.*, to give the statement of our right to interfere a more specific form, and then presented it under a title calculated to cloud the reason and rouse the fanaticism of our people. He might have learned a salutary lesson from that predecessor in his office who stands,

as a diplomatist, head and shoulders above any other who has ever occupied it, and who, in dealing with the only issue in our diplomacy which ever called for the application of the real Monroe Doctrine, did not, as we have seen, use that title at all, but rested upon the general principle, which is an accepted maxim of international law.

Mr. Olney may have some way satisfactory to himself of excusing his inconsistency ; but the people of a republic worthy of its name and capable of self-government, dare not allow him to dragoon them into a course of hostility to a friendly power,—a power whose friendship is of more value to them than that of all the other powers of the earth put together,—until he shall have clearly demonstrated that the interests menaced are really, directly and seriously menaced, and are greater than the interests to be sacrificed in repelling the menace. All of the cheap bombast about defending principles and honor will not make good the failure to prove the menace — its directnesss, its seriousness and its extent— to the interests of the country. This is not the age of crusades. If there is any fundamental distinction between the spirit of mediævalism and that of modern civilization, it is that in the modern era men and nations do not appeal to force, but to reason, in settling questions of mere principle. And if such questions cannot be settled at a given moment to the satisfaction of both parties, reason commands delay, fuller information and further deliberation.

As to the cry of honor infringed, I have known this claim so frequently and so basely abused, that I must insist upon the minutest demonstration of its truthfulness, before I can agree that any rational man is morally obligated to pay the slightest attention to it. In the very matter before us, how can any man in possession of common sense make out a case of affront by Great Britain to the honor of the United States? If I understand the propositions of Mr. Olney and Mr. Cleveland, to state them in the coarse language of the camp, they are that these gentlemen suspect Great Britain of being a land robber, that they believe her assurances to the contrary to be

false, that they are going to find out about it for themselves, and that if from their investigations it turns out that their suspicions are confirmed by their opinions, they are going to uphold these opinions by all the force at their command. After the assumption of such an attitude, I can hardly see how they can make the plea of affronted honor work on their side. It seems to me that they have driven Great Britain to the wall, and that unless they give way in some degree, Great Britain will find it very difficult to maintain peace without humiliation.¹ They have been able to assume an appearance of superior justice by representing that all they have asked for is an impartial arbitration between Great Britain and Venezuela, and by claiming that, because Great Britain has declined it in regard to a part of the territory to which Venezuela lays claim, she has virtually declined it altogether, and has thus manifested a lack of confidence in her own case. This statement of their position has perhaps exerted more influence in their favor over the minds of the people than anything else. But the people are bound to reflect upon the distinction between *asking* two friendly powers to arbitrate differences between themselves and *threatening one of them with war if it declines*. They are bound to remember that the United States government has freely declined proposals for arbitration. And they are also bound to remember that in putting some limitations upon the extent of the claim to be arbitrated, Great Britain has the authority of the United States themselves, whose commissioners, in the year 1871, refused the proposal of the British commissioners to arbitrate the whole northwest water boundary question, and limited the arbitration to the question of the Haro or Rosario channels.

I have spent many years in the study of diplomatic correspondence, and I am utterly unable to find any affront to the honor of the United States in the reply of Lord Salisbury to

¹ It is to be hoped that the British government will regard the wise and diplomatic note of Justice Brewer, president of the commission, in reference to the evidence on the boundary question, as a friendly advance on the part of our administration.

Mr. Olney's note, except perhaps upon the principle that we consider ourselves insulted if other people decline to take our advice *in toto*; while over against Mr. Cleveland's swelling indignation at the wrong which he fancies we may suffer, I would place the great principle of Christian ethics that it is far more culpable to do wrong than to suffer it.

But let us return to our demand upon Mr. Olney, that he should have proven to the common reason the menace to the integrity, tranquillity or welfare of the United States involved in the refusal of Great Britain to submit the entire claim of Venezuela upon her to arbitration, before moving his chief to sound the note of war or even of alarm. Such menace he has not proven. He has assumed it as if there were no question in regard to it—as if it were self-evident. In this we cannot follow him. To say the least, it is certainly questionable whether the integrity, tranquillity or welfare of the United States would be in the slightest degree menaced, if the whole of South America were under the colonial system of the British Empire. It is even a question for discussion by a rational people whether, in such case, that integrity, tranquillity and welfare would not be enhanced above present conditions. Great Britain is far more really and soundly democratic in her institutions to-day than any South American state. It is not improbable that, as colonies of Great Britain, South American countries would enjoy far more peace and liberty than as Spanish-Indian states; and it was the reign of peace and liberty in the Americas which Monroe declared to be the ultimate object of his "Doctrine," and it was from that point of view that Jefferson approved it. Certainly there is more real liberty in Canada and in Guiana than in any of the South American states; and the countries in the Americas in which peace has reigned most undisturbed are British colonies. It is not at all improbable that, if the whole of South America were under the colonial system of Great Britain, real English colonies would be planted there, destined to ripen into real English-American states, which would establish peace with real liberty and stable government, and, in place of retarding the progress and consuming the

substance of these lands in endless revolutions, would develop their resources and make them contributory to the commerce and welfare of the United States and of the whole world. Now I do not assume that this would be the result. It is a speculation. But it contains sufficient probability to merit discussion from a rational people, and to prevent a contrary assumption without discussion.

As a matter of present fact, however, the general extension of the British colonial system over South America does not confront us as either probable or possible. The question before us is simply whether the United States will be menaced in their integrity, tranquillity or welfare by allowing Great Britain and Venezuela to settle, without their interference, an old dispute about a boundary line, the nearest point of which is nearly as distant from any part of the territory of the United States as Newfoundland is from Ireland, and is less accessible from us than Boston is from Queenstown. Not even Mr. Olney claims that there is any *direct* menace involved; and it must be remembered that only a *direct* menace warrants the interference of the menaced third party in the controversies between the two parties directly concerned. He argues that if Great Britain can take a little more in this manner than Venezuela thinks she is entitled to, or than the United States think she is entitled to, then she can take more and more and more until — she gets a great deal. He does not even consider that, when the line is once fixed between Guiana and Venezuela, even though it should give Guiana more than he thinks Guiana entitled to have, an attempt on the part of Great Britain to take more would present an altogether different question, *viz.*, that of a conquest of territory pure and simple. If that should ever happen, then will be the time to deal with it. But to deal with it now, upon the basis of a suspicion, cannot be justified by any international or ethical principle with which I am acquainted, and I certainly think it would be a crazy internal policy that should advise such action. And what are the interests which Mr. Olney proposes to jeopardize in repelling a menace which, if it exists at all, — and I cannot by any

stretch of the imagination conceive this to be the case,—is exceedingly petty and remote? They are the peace of the United States with the greatest power on earth, with the power more nearly akin to the United States in blood, language, history, literature, customs, laws and institutions than any other power on earth,—with their own motherland; the commerce of the United States with that power, amounting to as much as their commerce with all the other powers of the world put together; the security of the United States against invasion by that mighty power; the wealth of the United States to be exhausted in such a terrible struggle; the blood of the citizens of the United States to be poured out in an almost fratricidal war; and the liberties of the United States to be sacrificed under the necessities of a military régime. These are not all, from the point of view of the United States alone; and to these must be added all those interests which are of more universal concern, and which would be sacrificed by the example of the two most civilized powers on earth reintroducing the barbarism of war for the determination of their own disputes. This is monstrous folly as a mere proposition. In realization, it would be a crime against the country, against morality, religion, civilization and common sense.

I hope that I am not dealing unfairly either with Mr. Olney or with Mr. Cleveland in attributing to the former the invention of the idea of the new doctrine, and to the latter only the attachment of the forms of power to it. It seems very probable, at least, that such is the proper assignment of responsibility, and that whatever personal or political advantage or disadvantage may accrue from the promulgation of the doctrine should belong in higher degree to Mr. Olney than to Mr. Cleveland. Nor can he be deprived of the credit nor relieved from the odium, whichever it may turn out to be in the long run, by any frantic attempts of the Congress to outdo him. The people of the country have been too long in politics to be deceived, however much they may be amused, by such antics.

Down to this point I have treated of the doctrines, called Monroe Doctrines, advanced by the administration. I must

now consider a doctrine, or rather a spirit, which is widespread throughout the country and has a grasp upon the people, and which is extremely menacing to the true interests of the nation. It is the hatred of Great Britain. I recently heard a great international lawyer, who has held high official position in the diplomatic service of the government, say that there has hardly been a period in our history when a President of the United States could not excite the people of the United States to assume a belligerent attitude toward Great Britain. The existence of such a spirit among the people against any power is a constant menace to our own peace and welfare; and it should not only be held in check by the government, but the causes of it should be carefully examined, and if it is seen to be not founded in right reason, it should be eradicated from the popular mind.

There is no question that the usual way of interpreting the history of the Revolution in our common schools, if not in our higher institutions of learning, is one of the prime causes of the existence of this spirit. Our children are not taught that our motherland, having been at very great expense in protecting us against the attempts of the French to seize the whole east valley of the Mississippi to the head waters of the Ohio, thought naturally that the colonies thus protected should bear a part of the burden; that she undertook to impose it at first as an internal excise, and then withdrew it in the face of protests, which acknowledged to her the right of levying customs on imports; that when she undertook to exercise this acknowledged right, her American colonists again resisted, and that she again receded before their protests, until at last but a single article was made subject to duty; that although the revolt was apparently provoked by her insistence upon this right, yet the real issue was the independence of an adult nation, now able to manage its own affairs, against the supervision of a country removed from it by three thousand miles of water; that no matter whether the colonial policy of that country had been mild or severe, the consciousness of having arrived at adult powers, once attained, would have

caused the invention of an issue, if none were at hand, for throwing off that supervision ; that in the modification of colonial governments, the motherland was probably within her rights legally, although the policy of it might have been bad ; and that it was natural for a motherland to regard armed resistance to her laws as rebellion, and endeavor to suppress it by military force. On the other hand, our children have been taught, and are taught, that the motherland did nothing for our protection, cared nothing for our interests, undertook to rob us by taxation, deprive us of our personal liberty by deportation, violate our charters of government without warrant of law or justice, treat us as slaves, and then do us to death for daring to resist.

Likewise the history of the war of 1812-1815, as taught in our schools, dwells only upon the impressment of American seamen for the British navy, and the depredations upon the commerce of the United States ; but has little to say concerning our partiality for the French in the struggle to place a Napoleonic despotism over all continental Europe, which Great Britain was using all of her power to prevent ; little to say about the rampant jingoism of the new West under the lead of that young, fiery and fanatical pair, Clay and Grundy, dazzling the people with their plan for the conquest of Canada ; and almost nothing to say about the facts that in many cases British seamen were harbored on American vessels, and that in taking enemy's goods out of neutral bottoms and in proclaiming blockades, Great Britain was, though following an illiberal policy, not then violating any principle of international law.

It is little wonder that with such interpretations of early American history, our youth have grown up with bitter prejudices against the "Old England," which are cherished and directed in their manhood against the England of to-day. It is high time that a less *ex parte* view of American history should be taught in our common schools ; it is an educational scandal that it is not.

There is, in the second place, no question that the attitude

of Great Britain during our Civil War caused, whether justly or not, great bitterness of feeling against her, both at the North and at the South. The people of the North felt, and were taught by their leaders to think, that in recognizing the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy, and in not preventing her subjects from furnishing war material to the Southern Confederacy, Great Britain manifested a sympathy for the giant rebellion against a government friendly to her. And on the other hand, the people in the South felt, and were taught by their leaders to think, that in refusing to recognize the independence of the Southern Confederacy, and in observing the blockade of the ports of the Southern Confederacy by the United States navy, Great Britain manifested undue sympathy for the North in the settlement of a question internal to this country, in which she should have been entirely impartial and neutral. But nobody seems to feel, or to think, or to remember, that in the arbitration of the differences between the United States and Great Britain growing out of the attitude of the British government and the acts of British subjects during that war, Great Britain generously allowed the application of principles, in the determination of her responsibilities to the United States, which had not to that time been clearly established as principles of international law. The interpretation of recent American history certainly stands in need of some emendation upon these points.

There is, in the third place, no shadow of a doubt that the competition of the two great political parties in the United States for the Irish-American vote, and their consequent efforts to outdo each other in embracing the cause of "Irish Home Rule" against Great Britain, have led to an almost complete ignoring of the British side of this question, and to an almost universal belief that Great Britain, in striving to preserve the union of the realm, is an unmitigated tyrant in Ireland.

And, lastly, the methods employed by the British people and government in the extension of the British Empire have been so represented and epitheted as to produce another cur-

rent of dislike against Great Britain among a people who regard all men as having been created equal. It is taught by most of those who form the public opinion of the United States that the British Empire is a gigantic system of land robbery, and that it prospers by stealing the country and the wealth of other peoples and reducing them to a servitude little better than serfdom. It is rarely mentioned that, in some cases, the lands taken were wildernesses, the peoples made subject to British rule were barbarians, and the wealth acquired was created by British enterprise and capital employing and paying for labor which before had lain dormant; or that, in other cases, British rule has been invited by anarchy and political decay among peoples who could have no longer preserved themselves against a return to barbarism but for the aid of the great empire. And it does not seem to be remembered that the United States owe their own existence to the same kind of land-grabbing, in the beginning, which they now condemn, and their own extension to the commission of something like the same awful robberies themselves. The British Empire is indeed a great and successful organization, and it has excited the jealousies of the world; but as rational men we dare not represent the mighty work for civilization which it has done as a robbery of rights and of property.

These are some of the streams that combine to form the current of dislike which runs through our history against Great Britain, and which at times sets so strongly against her as to become an active and dangerous hatred. It is with such a popular spirit that the government of the United States must always reckon in its diplomacy with Great Britain. Any claims, however exaggerated, which that government may put forth against Great Britain will be almost certain to be sustained and applauded. In fact when this spirit is once excited, it is very difficult for the government to hold its own footing at all against it. It is the most dangerous weapon in all our arsenal of popular prejudices. It is a spirit which no rational people should allow to dominate them for one moment — a spirit which marks any people who do allow its domination

over them as irrational. But culpable as it is, it is here, and the government of this country assumes a fearful responsibility by tampering with it in the slightest degree.

It is to be fervently hoped that the administration will keep this constantly in mind, that the commission which has been appointed will not forget it, and that the Congress, upon whom may rest, in last resort, the responsibility for peace or war, will clearly understand that if they allow this popular prejudice, this passion of hate, to influence them in the slightest degree in the determination of a question of international justice, they will, each man of them, have made themselves guilty of the greatest crime which mortal man can commit — the sevenfold crime against life, liberty, property, peace, justice, good-will between nations, and civilization itself.

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